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When a "Rule" Doesn't Rule: The Failure
of the Oregon Employment Division v. Smith
"Hybrid Rights Exception"
Steven H. Aden*and Lee J. Strang**
I.

Introduction

More than a decade has passed since the Supreme Court rearranged
the landscape of free exercise jurisprudence in Employment Division v.2
Smith,I and courts and scholars continue to wrestle with its meaning.
This Article will review one aspect of the Smith decision, the "hybrid
* J.D., cum laude, Georgetown University Law Center; B.A., University of
Hawaii. Mr. Aden serves as Chief Litigation Counsel to The Rutherford Institute, a
nonprofit civil liberties organization headquartered in Charlottesville, Virginia. The
author wishes to thank his wife, Molly Aden, for her unflagging support and counsel in
this and many other projects. "A virtuous woman, who can find?" Proverb 31:10.
** LL.M., Harvard Law School; J.D., University of Iowa College of Law; B.A.,
Loras College. Mr. Strang is an Associate with Jenner & Block, LLC in Chicago,
Illinois. Mr. Strang wishes to thank his loving wife, Elizabeth, for her constant love and
support.
1. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2. See, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren
Song of Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 245 (1991) (supporting Smith by asserting that
the fixation on religious exemptions is the result of liberal individualism with its
emphasis on privatized religion); Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 743 (1992) (arguing against religious accommodation); Michael W.
McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685 (1992) (reviewing arguments concerning constitutional religious
exemptions) [hereinafter McConnell, Accommodation of Religion]; Michael W.
McConnell, Exchange; Religious Participationin Public Programs:Religious Freedom
at a Crossroads,59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115 (1992) (arguing that the religion clauses should
be read together to promote religious freedom) [hereinafter McConnell, Exchange];
Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1109 (1990) (criticizing Smith as both historically and philosophically wrong)
[hereinafter McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism]; Jane Rutherford, Religion,
Rationality, and Special Treatment, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 303 (2001) (criticizing
Smith and offering an alternative rationale for religious freedom); John Witte, Jr., The
Essential Rights andLiberties of Religion in the American ConstitutionalExperiment, 71
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371 (1996) (criticizing Smith by arguing that Smith fails to
recognize the four principles contained in the Free Exercise Clause).
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rights exception," 3 which promised to ameliorate the decision's harsher
aspects.4 The authors survey the doctrine's course of treatment in the
courts and legal commentaries and conclude that hybrid rights claims
have overwhelmingly failed to succeed. The authors find this surprising
in view of the fact that the doctrine's progenitor, Justice Antonin Scalia,
is a strong advocate for reliable judicial rules, and presumably intended
the hybrid rights doctrine to function as a predictive rule. Nonetheless, at
least one circuit court of appeals has categorically declined to apply the
hybrid rights doctrine, citing its unworkability, and several other federal
appellate and trial courts have criticized it. The authors suggest that the
doctrine should be modified by applying a more particularized and
hopefully more predictive approach that considers the relative strength of
the religious claimaint's interests, including the weight of the burden on
religious belief and practice imposed by requiring strict adherence to
neutral laws of general application and the government's interest in
mandating uniform compliance.
The authors will initially survey the Supreme Court free exercise
caselaw that preceded Smith. Then, following a brief look at Smith itself
and the language giving rise to the hybrid rights exception, the authors
will discuss the lack of success free exercise claims have enjoyed in
Smith's wake. The authors will briefly survey academic criticism of
Smith, and consider as well whether the hybrid rights doctrine in
particular is an aberration in Justice Scalia's own well-developed judicial
philosophy. Finally, the authors will seek to ascertain reasons for the
apparent lack of success constitutional litigators have had in employing
the hybrid rights doctrine as a rule for adjudicating free exercise claims,
and one possible reformulation of the doctrine that may facilitate its
predictive value.
II.

Background

The original meaning of the Free Exercise
vigorously debated. Some scholars have posited
dramatic departure from the original meaning of
Clause and the Court's prior jurisprudence. Michael

Clause has been
that Smith was a
the Free Exercise
McConnell, now a

3. The authors employ the term "hybrid rights exception" to denote the holding of
Smith that a claimant who seeks to invoke strict scrutiny review under the Free Exercise
Clause against the operation of a neutral law of general application that burdens the
claimant's religious beliefs or practices must demonstrate that the conduct sought to be
protected involved "the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional
protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press.., or the right of parents.., to
direct the education of their children .... " Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
4. See William L. Esser IV, Note, Religious Hybrids in the Lower Courts: Free
Exercise Plus or Constitutional Smoke Screen?, 74 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 211, 211
(1998).
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judge on the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, has written that even
though the Court did not do so in Smith, had it looked to the context in
which the First Amendment was debated and ratified, it would have
found "some significant evidence supporting its conclusion" that
exemptions to generally applicable laws were not intended. 5 McConnell
qualified this statement, arguing that he found the historical evidence to6
point more strongly "in favor of the broader exemptions position."
Specifically, McConnell referenced colonial and state free exercise
provisions, which, he claimed, arguably mandated religiously based
exemptions.7
Other evidence providing support for McConnell's
exemption position was garnered from8 the exemptions the states afforded
religious objectors from military duty.
A minority of scholars has challenged the backlash against Smith,
arguing that the Free Exercise Clause was never meant to grant to the
federal courts the authority to carve out exceptions to validly enacted
laws. Philip A. Hamburger has argued that Smith was merely righting
the historical error of the Court's past rulings that allowed courts to grant
exemptions from neutral and generally applicable laws. 9 Hamburger
asserted that it was the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. United States 0 that
was historically correct; government has the authority to enact laws
contrary to the religious beliefs of citizens, and religious beliefs do not
exempt citizens from compliance with validly enacted laws that are not
aimed at religious belief."
Hamburger relies, initially, on what he regards as a complete lack of
evidence from the early Republic that judges could craft religiously
based exemptions to statutes.12 Hamburger also challenged McConnell's
view of state constitutional provisions contemporaneous to the Free
Exercise Clause.' 3 Hamburger urged that the caveats relied upon by
McConnell-"not repugnant to the peace and safety of the State"-in
fact show that free exercise was circumscribed to prevent any
exemptions to laws because any breach of the laws constituted a breach
of the "peace" as understood by contemporaries. 1 4 Hamburger's
5. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 2, at 1117.
6. Id. For an extremely thorough and well-thought review of the historical
understanding of the Free Exercise Clause, see Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and
HistoricalUnderstandingof Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990).
7. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 2, at 1118.
8. Id.
9. Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An
HistoricalPerspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992).
10. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
11. Hamburger, supra note 9.
12. Id. at 917.
13. Id. at 920-21.
14. Id.
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strongest argument is from the intellectual climate, heavily influenced by
John Locke, at the time the Free Exercise Clause was drafted and
ratified.1 5 Locke posited that in the world of actions-the world
governed by the civil government-the government and its
determinations were supreme.' 6 As a result, the government, which was
instituted to protect and prevent infringement of rights, could do so at the
expense of a person's religious beliefs, but because another's beliefs
cannot, in a Lockean sense, harm another, the government has no right to
interfere with beliefs. 1 7 If an individual's beliefs urged him to disobey a
law, Locke argued that insofar as the sphere of religion is not that of the
world of actions, and because there is no higher power on Earth to whom
the objector can appeal, the dissenter must obey his conscience and
suffer the penalties inflicted by the magistrate. 1819 Thus, Hamburger
makes a strong case in support of the Reynolds rule.
The first Supreme Court case of import with reference to the Free
Exercise Clause was Reynolds v. United States.20 There, the Court faced
the prosecution for polygamy of a Mormon who argued that his actions,
because they were mandated by his early Mormon religious beliefs, were
excused from compliance with the federal statute in question. 2 1 The
Court, with Chief Justice Waite writing, ruled that the Free Exercise
Clause protected individuals' beliefs against regulation by the federal
government, not their actions.2 2 The Court adhered to a distinction
between the proper spheres of authority for civil government and
religion: government has authority over individuals' actions.23 With
language later echoed and quoted in Smith, the Reynolds Court wrote that
to permit religious exemptions from laws "would be to make the
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the24land, and
in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.,
In Cantwell v. Connecticut,25 the Court "incorporated" the Free
Exercise Clause against the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 6 The Court struck down the prosecution of
Jehovah's Witnesses who were convicted of violating a city ordinance
15.

See id.

16. John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration 9-19, in 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN
LOCKE (London 1823).

17.
18.

Id.

19.
20.

See Hamburger, supra note 9.
98 U.S. 145 (1878).

21.
22.

Id. at 161-68.
Id. at 166-67.

23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id. at 167.
310 U.S. 296 (1940).
Id.at 303-04.

Id. at 43.
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when they distributed materials and proselytized in city neighborhoods.2 7
The defendants argued that their convictions violated the Fourteenth
Amendment; specifically, their rights to free speech and free exercise.2 8
The Court held that a citizen's free exercise rights could require
exemption from otherwise applicable laws. 29 While rejecting the
Reynolds decision's distinction between belief and action, the Court had
to ensure that government could effectually administer its police powers.
The Court did so by decreeing that, henceforth, federal courts would
balance the governmental interest in protecting the "peace, good order
and comfort" of society against the asserted liberty interest of the
religious adherent.3 ° While Cantwell is often regarded as principally a
free exercise case, it is clear that the defendants' free speech rights also
carried great weight with the Court.
After a very brief "backslide" in the same year as the Cantwell
decision, 1 the Court stated what became known as the compelling
interest test in free exercise jurisprudence.3 2 In Sherbert v. Verner, the
Court exempted from a South Carolina unemployment, compensation
requirement a Seventh-Day Adventist who was fired because she refused
to work on Saturday, her Sabbath.33
The appellant's claim for
unemployment compensation was denied because she had failed to meet
the statutory requirement as a result of her refusal to accept employment
that required her to work on Saturday.34 Because the state failed to show
that its work requirement was justified by a compelling state interest, the
Court ruled that the state was bound to grant the appellant an exemption
under the Free Exercise Clause.35
Wisconsin v. Yoder 36 was, in many ways, the high water mark of
free exercise mandated exemptions.37 There, Chief Justice Burger did
not employ an explicit strict scrutiny test, and instead required the
27. Id. at 311.
28. Id. at 302.
29. Id. at 303-04.
30. Id. at 304.
31. In Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), the Court upheld
the suspension of children whose parents refused to allow the children to participate in
the daily Pledge of Allegiance and salute of the flag. The Court rejected the proposition
that the Free Exercise Clause required exemptions from general laws that were not
directed at religious belief or practice. Id. at 594-95. "Judicial nullification of legislation
cannot be justified by attributing to the framers of the Bill of Rights views for which
there is no historical warrant." Id. at 594. Citizens were, despite their religious scruples,
required to obey laws not aimed at the "restriction of religious belief." Id.
32. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
33. Id. at 399.
34. Id. at 401.
35. Id. at 407.
36. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
37. Id. at214-15.
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Wisconsin mandatory education laws, as applied to Amish children
between grades eight and twelve, to have more than a merely "reasonable
relation" to a legitimate state purpose. 38 According to the Court, two
rights were implicated in Yoder: the parental right to direct the education
of children recognized in Pierce v. Society of the Sisters,39 and the right
to free exercise. 40 The Court ruled that the Free Exercise Clause required
Wisconsin to exempt the Amish students from the mandatory education
requirement.4 1
In the years following Yoder, the Court has recognized exemptions
from neutral and generally applicable laws only in cases involving the
unemployment compensation area.42 For example, in both Thomas v.
Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division,43 and
44
the Court
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission of Florida,
ruled that the states in question did not have interests compelling enough
to apply their unemployment compensation laws to the claimants in those
cases. Both Thomas and Hobbie are readily explainable as applications
of Sherbert, which was directly on point for both cases. The Court in
United States v. Lee4 5 rejected the free exercise claim brought by an
Amish employer who objected on religious grounds to the federal
requirement that he pay social security taxes for his Amish employees.46
In Bowen v. Roy,47 the Court refused to exempt a Native American child
from the requirement of receiving a social security number in order to
qualify for public assistance on the basis that the number would "rob the
spirit" of the child.4 8 An Orthodox Jew's free exercise claim for an
exemption to Air Force regulations that forbade him to wear a yarmulke
was denied in Goldman v. Weinberger.49 Finally, in Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n,5° the Court denied relief to Native
38. Id. at 233.
39. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). In Pierce, the Court struck down an Oregon law that
required all children to attend public school as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. Id.
40. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233.
41. Id. at 234-35.
42. In McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), the Supreme Court struck down a
Tennessee statute that prohibited ministers and priests from serving as delegates to a state
constitutional convention. The statute in question was directed solely at religious
believers, a different context from cases in which neutral, generally applicable laws were
challenged.
43. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
44. 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
45. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
46. Id. at 261.
47. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
48. Id. at 712.
49. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
50. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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Americans who sought to forbid the building of a road in a national park
to harvest timber because the area was traditionally utilized by Native
American tribes for religious purposes. 5'
While the Court continually rejected the claims of free exercise
plaintiffs, it continued to invoke the language of the compelling state
interest test. It thus appeared that the Supreme Court had settled on
applying a watered-down version of strict scrutiny in the area of free
exercise.
The Supreme Court, in Smith, did what no one expected; it unsettled
settled law and announced a new rule of free exercise jurisprudence.
Smith was the result of a petition by Alfred Smith and Galen Black, two
members of the Native American Church, which had as one of its
ceremonies the ingestion of peyote, a hallucinogenic drug. 2 Smith and
Black were fired from their jobs with a private drug rehabilitation
organization for their drug usage.53 Smith and Black thereafter filed for
unemployment compensation, which the Oregon administrative agency
denied because it determined they had been fired for employment
misconduct and were thus ineligible. 4
The Oregon Supreme Court ruled that while peyote use was subject
to criminal prohibition in Oregon, the Free Exercise Clause mandated an
exception to the misconduct exclusion, thus requiring that Smith and
Black receive unemployment compensation. 55 On Oregon's appeal, the
claimants likely felt confident that the Court's prior free exercise
jurisprudence in the area of unemployment compensation would lead to
affirmance.
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, resorted to the older
Reynolds dichotomy between religious belief and religiously motivated
action.56 Under this analysis, the Free Exercise Clause protects religious
belief absolutely. The Court noted that the Free Exercise Clause also
protects actions prohibited solely because of the actions' religious
motivation.57 Because the criminal law at issue in Smith was generally
applicable and not directed at religiously motivated action solely because
of its religious impetus, the Free Exercise Clause did not mandate an
exemption. 58
The Court rejected what it characterized as the
respondents' asserted right to an exemption from a neutral and generally
51.
52.
(1990).
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 442.
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874
Id.
Id.
Id. at 876.
Id. at 877.
Id.
Id. at 878.
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applicable criminal prohibition.59
Justice Scalia observed that the Supreme Court had never ruled that
free exercise principles necessitated an exception from a neutral law
simply because the law conflicted with the religious scruples of one or
more persons.6 ° Instead, in language giving birth to the "hybrid rights"
exception to the Smith rule, the Court noted that a religious exemption
was granted only when the conduct involved "the Free Exercise Clause
in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of
speech and of the press ... or the rights of parents. . . to direct the
education of their children." 6 1 The cases cited to support this proposition
included Cantwell v. Connecticut,62 Murdock v. Pennsylvania,63 Piercev.
Society of Sisters,64 and Wisconsin v. Yoder.65 The Court further hinted
at the potential for hybrid cases in relation to free exercise and free
association grounds, 66 citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees.67 The
Court synthesized its prior free exercise jurisprudence, stating that past
cases that had required exemptions from neutral, generally applicable
laws presented "hybrid situation[s]" where there was a free exercise
68
claim connected with a "communicative activity or parental right."
The Court further limited the earlier compelling interest test
elucidated in Sherbert6 9 to the unemployment compensation context,
finding dispositive the individualized determinations made by states
when assessing entitlement to unemployment compensation. 70
In
addition, the Court stated that the Sherbert test had diminished in
importance in light of the Court's later jurisprudence and had never
invalidated a general and neutral law outside of the employment
compensation context. 71 As a result, Smith was only making explicit a
limitation on Sherbert that was previously implicit.
Finally, the Supreme Court bolstered its holding by reference to its
59. Id.
60. Id. at 878-79.
61. Id. at 881.
62. 310 U.S. 296, 304-07 (1940) (invalidating a licensing system).
63. 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (invalidating a flat tax on solicitation).
64. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating an Oregon law prohibiting private religious
education).
65. 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (invalidating a Wisconsin mandatory child education law as
applied to Old Order Amish children past the eighth grade).
66. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
67. 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (recognizing right of association held by members of
expressive association but affirming application of prohibition on gender discrimination
under Minnesota Human Rights Act to nonprofit association that was nonselective in
membership).
68. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
69. 374 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1963).
70. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
71. Id. at 883-84.
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fear that to allow exemptions based on religious belief would wreak
havoc upon the government's ability to prohibit "socially harmful
Quoting Reynolds, the Court reaffirmed that the
conduct., 72
government's ability to carry out public policy is not contingent on the
religious beliefs of each and every American because permitting such
exceptions would allow each "to become a law unto himself. ' 73 A true

compelling interest test, one unlike the Court's previous weak test, would
create an individual right to ignore general and neutral laws. 74 The Court
concluded that the relative disadvantage to which minority religions are
placed by not according them exemptions is an acceptable cost of living
in a radically pluralistic society where laws are created by a popular
political process.75
III.

Scholarly Debate Post-Smith

The decision in Smith prompted a flurry of criticism from the
academy. Smith has the rather unusual distinction of being one case that
is almost universally despised (and this is not too strong a word) by both
liberals and conservatives. Liberals chasten the Court for its hostility to
minority faiths which, in light of Smith's general applicability rule, will
allegedly suffer at the hands of the majority faith either through outright
hostility or neglect. Conservatives bemoan the decision as an assault on
religious belief leaving religion, more than ever, subject to the caprice of
an ever more secular nation that is increasingly hostile to religious belief
as an oppressive and archaic anachronism.
As noted earlier, Michael McConnell (and many others) criticize
Smith on a number of bases. First, McConnell argues that the Court's
construction of the language of the Free Exercise Clause--emphasizing
the protection of religious belief instead of "free exercise"--although
permissible, is not the most textually probable meaning. 76 Second,
McConnell concedes that the original meaning of the clause is not
conclusive. 77 This concession serves only to highlight for McConnell the
complete lack of historical review performed by Justice Scalia for such
an important question.78 Third, McConnell questions the Court's
"shocking" use of precedent.79 In doing so, McConnell dismisses the
hybrid rights category created in Smith to deal with past decisions not in
72.
73.

Id. at 884.
Id.

74.

Id. at 886.

75.

Id. at 890.

76.
77.
78.
79.

McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 2, at 1114-16.
Id. at 1117-19.
Id.
Id. at 1120-28.
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line with the
new Smith rule as an expedient "not intended to be taken
80
seriously."
In a subsequent article, McConnell attempts to explain the virtues of
religious accommodations and by implication the error of Smith.8 The
purpose of accommodation is to allow "individuals and groups to
exercise their religion.., without hindrance. 8 2 McConnell believes that
religious accommodation, including religious exemptions: (1) is
consistent with the language of the First Amendment; (2) best serves the
purpose of the religion clauses-to enhance freedom to "carry out one's
duties towards God;, 83 (3) protects minority faiths from the effects,
either willful or otherwise, of majoritarianism; and (4) is consonant with
the historical context surrounding the advocacy for and ratification of the
religion clauses, which demonstrates that religious exemptions are
permissible and desirable. 84 Viewed in the light of the desirability and
permissibility of religious exemptions and in the context of the purpose
of accommodation grounded in the religion clauses, Smith is a tragic
mistake, defeating the primary purpose of securing and expanding
85
religious liberty.
Professor Gerard Bradley of Notre Dame is the odd man out. He
analyzes McConnell's claims surrounding Smith and especially
McConnell's claim that the original meaning 86 of the Free Exercise
Clause possibly included mandatory exemptions.87 Bradley argues
persuasively that Smith correctly rejected approximately thirty years of
free exercise jurisprudence and resurrected the belief/action dichotomy
from Reynolds, which is more faithful to the original meaning of the

80. Id. at 1122.
81. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, supra note 2, at 685.
82. Id.at 688.
83. See McConnell, Exchange, supra note 2 (reviewing the jurisprudential history of
the religion clauses and arguing that they should be read consistently to provide for the
maximum amount of religious freedom). This view of the religion clauses would lead to
a "formal neutrality toward religion. Under Smith, the Free Exercise Clause precludes
government action that is 'directed at,' or 'singles out,' religion for unfavorable
treatment. The Establishment Clause analog would be to preclude government action
that singles out religion for favorable treatment." Id. at 166. Thus, McConnell proposes
that citizens should be free "to exercise their religious differences without hindrance from
the state (unless necessary to important purposes of civil government), whether that
hindrance is for or against religion." Id. at 168.
84. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, supra note 2, at 690-94.
85. Id. at 695-96, 710-13.
86. Bradley begins his article with an interesting discussion of original meaning
interpretation. Bradley, supra note 2, at 248-261. Bradley, in line with the most
sophisticated originalists, takes, as the relevant meaning of the words in the Constitution,
"the standard or prevailing definition of terms, drawn from their customary usage in the
relevant field of discourse." Id. at 248.
87. Id. at 247-48.
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clause. 88 Bradley first asserts that society can-and must, if it is to avoid
anarchy-be able to prohibit conduct, even religiously motivated
conduct, based on reasons not connected to religious expression.89 The
90
Framers, Bradley believes, adopted this Lockean view of free exercise.
To rebut McConnell's historical argument, Bradley convincingly delves
into antebellum judicial interpretation of federal and state guarantees of
free exercise. 9'
Professor Douglas Laycock views Smith in light of what he takes to
be two different forms of religious conflict. 92 The first type of conflict,
93
not much in play today, is that between religions or denominations.
This inter-religion conflict still exists when fringe religions or faiths
come into conflict with the morality or policy of the larger society.94
More relevant today is the conflict between religion and secular interests,
including the government. 95 This conflict is more pertinent in today's
age of non-belief or hostility to religion and of government, both state
and federal, that regulates an ever greater portion of public and private
life.96 Corresponding to these two types of conflict are two views on
what religious freedom entails. Smith exemplifies one view: religious
freedom consists of the equal treatment of all faiths.9 7 The other, broader
view of religious freedom entails envisioning religious freedom as a
liberty right, providing a certain minimum quantum of freedom no matter
how other religious faiths are treated. 98 Professor Laycock proceeds to
criticize Smith for its failure to recognize the weaknesses of the equality
model upon which it was based. 99 Smith's main shortcoming, according
88. Id.
89. Id. at 261-64.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 266-306. Bradley then goes on to state that he believes McConnell bought
into the modem liberalism he was so strenuously attempting to avoid by basing most of
his policy arguments for a conduct exemption on the premise that the state has no proper
place in helping guide its citizens to the correct vision of the good life. Id. at 307-18.
This premise of anti-paternalism is based, in turn, on skepticism as to the ability of man
to come to know the truth, or whether there is a truth. Id. Given these two propositions,
it follows easily that one would advocate exemptions for individuals who have beliefs
contrary to that of the majority.
If one accepts Bradley's view of what modem liberalism entails-no paternalism
in the area of moral truths-then it appears that McConnell has indeed bought into the
liberal project. See McConnell, Exchange, supra note 2, at 168-69.
92. Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom RestorationAct, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 883 (1994).
93. Id. at 883-84.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 884-85.
96. Id.
97. ld. at 885.
98. Id. at 885-86.
99. Id. at 892-95.

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 108:2

to Laycock, is the diminished protection afforded religion in the face of
increasing government regulation. 0 0
Based on Laycock's premise that Smith is founded on an equality
view of religious liberty, Richard F. Duncan, in his article Free Exercise
Is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi and the General
Applicability Requirement, argues that Smith's general applicability rule
is not as harsh as critics make it out to be and is necessary in our
radically pluralistic society, which would court anarchy if it granted
exemptions based on religious beliefs. 0 1 The Smith rule protects
religious belief and exercise adequately by substituting a conception
based on equality
for a liberty-based conception of free exercise, Duncan
02
contends. 1

Scholars who supported Smith (besides Professor Bradley)
frequently did not do so by opposing the arguments that the Court was
wrong as a matter of original meaning or that the decision conflicted with
precedent; those points were often conceded. Instead, such academics
believe that an exemption to neutral laws based on one's religious beliefs
is unfair or unsupportable in a modern, secular society.1 0 3 William
Marshall, responding to McConnell's bemoaning the loss of the
constitutional religious exemption, asserted that religiously-based
exemptions are unfair, bad policy, and are an establishment of religion
because "similar" secular beliefs cannot gain exemptions. 0 4 In fact,
Marshall claimed that a constitutionally mandated "preference" for
religiously motivated activity violated the principles
underlying the Free
5
Speech Clause and the Establishment Clause. 1
100. Id.
101. Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise Is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith,
Lukumi and the GeneralApplicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J.CONST. L. 850 (2001).
102. Id. at 881-83.
103. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable
Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 555 (1998)
[hereinafter Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation] (asserting that because the legal community
is no longer religious, and there is no imperative historical or precedential reason,
religious exemptions are a notion whose time has passed); Frederick Mark Gedicks,
Towards a Defensible Free Exercise Doctrine, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 925 (2000)
(arguing that because American society is no longer religious, religious exemptions can
no longer be justified because people do not see any qualitative difference between
religiously motivated and secularly motivated actions).
104. William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U.
CHI. L. REV. 308, 319-23 (1991).
105. Id. at 319-28. One can certainly doubt Marshall's claim that free exercise
exemptions violate the Establishment Clause, considering the completely ahistorical view
upon which Marshall must have grounded his argument. Marshall also makes the point
that because some belief systems he labels "religions" are non-theistic, McConnell's
justification for exemptions-belief in a future state of rewards and punishments-is
overbroad. The difficulty with Marshall's arguments is that they are not neutrally derived
from any source extrinsic to what he believes is the best policy to govern the nation,
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In a similar manner, Frederick Gedicks, after cataloging the
traditional justifications for mandatory free exercise exemptions-that
exemptions implement the text and original meaning of the Constitution,
avoid forcing believers to violate their consciences, and are necessary to
keep peace by avoiding putting believers to the test-argued that these
10 6
rationales were no longer plausible in light of a secular legal culture.
Under Gedicks's view of the standing of religious belief in society vis-Afor
vis other, secular belief systems, Smith is the morally best outcome
10 7
which one desiring to maximize religious freedom could hope.
Some scholars seek to interpret the Free Exercise Clause in light 1of
08
what they perceive, in Dworkinian terms, as its morally best reading.
One such article, Jane Rutherford's Religion, Rationality, and Special
Treatment,10 9 advances the thesis that the' religion clauses serve
numerous purposes, including distributing societal power throughout the
society in numerous organizations and individuals, empowering
minorities by providing a voice for "outsiders," and increasing
spirituality, thereby allowing the input of moral values into the larger
society and fostering individual identity. 1 0 In light of what Rutherford
labels her "structural argument" for religious liberty, she paints a hazy
picture of the content of religious liberty, one that certainly does not
contain Smith or its rule."' Smith, according to Rutherford, has the
unfortunate characteristic of subjecting minority faiths to the rule of the
majority, thereby preventing the distribution of power throughout society
the
into different religious organizations and individuals, and decreasing
112
ability of individuals to express their individual spirituality.
A more sophisticated view of Smith is advanced by John Witte in
his article, The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the
American Constitutional Experiment.' 13 Witte argues that the religion
clauses, as a matter of original meaning, embody six principles: (1)
liberty of conscience; (2) free exercise; (3) pluralism; (4) equality; (5)
separationism; (6) and disestablishment. 114 These principles were
while McConnell starts from the more originalist premise that the original meaning of the
text of the Constitution is important.
106. Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation,supra note 103, at 556-68.
107. Id. at 568-72.
108. See, e.g., Fr. Richard John Neuhaus, A New Order of Religious Freedom, 60
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 620 (1992) (stating that religion-the basis for democracy because it
allows free men to govern themselves and undergirds the belief that all men are of equal
dignity and capable of governing themselves-should receive broad protection).
109. Rutherford, supranote 2, at 332.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 313-16, 338-40, 344-45.
112. Id.
113. Witte, supra note 2, at 371.
114. Id. at 388.
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enshrined in the Free Exercise Clause, not out of a necessarily wellthought and cohesive view of the relationship between religion and the
state, but as a result of the confluence of the views of that relationship
espoused by differing groups in society at the time of the ratification of
the First Amendment.' 15 Smith, in this paradigm, is seen as a movement
toward equality and away from the other values while, ironically, the
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence is seen as moving away
from one principle, disestablishment, and toward a multiplicity of
principles as envisioned by the framing generation." 6 Witte calls for an
"integrated approach" to the religion clauses of the First Amendment,
which seems to consist of an ad-hoc balancing of the six religion clause
principles in each case."'
Other commentators, touching only tangentially on Smith itself,
have surveyed the responses of the federal and state governments to
Smith. Stanley Friedelbaum, in his article Free Exercise in the States:
Belief Conduct, and JudicialBenchmarks, comments that the response
by the states has been rather muddled. 1 8 Friedelbaum notes that some
state courts have taken to an expansive interpretation of their own
religion clauses and have ended their dependence on federal free exercise
interpretation.' 9 The Ohio Supreme Court, for example, recently held
that Ohio's state constitution protects religious exercise to a greater
extent than does the Federal Constitution. 2 °
Some commentators dislike those who dislike Smith, believing that
Smith's critics seek to give religion too great a sway in public life at the
expense of purported Establishment Clause values and secular ideals.
One such critic, Ira Lupu, argues that any accommodationist view of free
exercise, such as that advocated by McConnell, has to face the difficulty
of defining when accommodations are mandated by the Constitution and
to avoid conflict with
the values believed to be found in the
21
Clause.'
Establishment
115. See id. at 376-78. Witte does not explain why, due to the fact that the religion
clauses were viewed by the founding generation as incorporating these six principles,
those who have come after that generation should adhere to them. He does seem to imply
that they were good principles and have served us well and that we should therefore
continue, what he labels, our experiment with religious freedom. Id. at 442-43.
116. See id. at 418-19, 425-27.
117. Id.at431-33.
118. See Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Free Exercise in the States: Belief Conduct, and
JudicialBenchmarks, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1059 (2000).
119. See id. at 1066-67.
120. See Jeffery D. Williams, Note, Humphrey v. Lane: The Ohio Constitution's
David Slays the Goliath of Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith, 34 AKRON L. REV. 919, 924-26 (2001) (discussing Humphrey v. Lane,
728 N.E.2d 1039 (Ohio 2000)).
121. See Lupu, supra note 2, at 747-54.
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In summation, Smith caused a storm of controversy. The reaction
was, except for a few notable exceptions, very hostile.
IV. Hybrid Claims' Lack of Success in the Courts
One would assume, a priori, that the Supreme Court's
pronouncement in Smith-that when a plaintiff pleads or brings both a
free exercise claim with another constitutional claim the combination
claim is still viable post-Smith-is the law. In fact, litigants assumed just
that, but the appellate courts have been thoroughly unreceptive to hybrid
right claims. Some courts have completely rejected hybrid rights claims;
the Sixth Circuit, for example, has asserted that it could "not see how a
state regulation would violate the Free Exercise Clause if it implicates
other constitutional rights but would not violate the Free Exercise Clause
if it did not implicate other constitutional rights."1 22 As a result, the
Sixth Circuit huffed that it would not use strict scrutiny for hybrid claims
until the Supreme Court "holds that legal standards under the Free
Exercise Clause vary depending on whether other constitutional rights
are implicated ....

,

Others, like the Ninth Circuit and some district

courts, have required that plaintiffs plead two "colorable" rights, one
being a free exercise claim. 124 There are also numerous courts that have
artfully dodged the question of what viability, if any, hybrid rights claims
possess. For example, in Swanson v. Gutherie Independent School
District, the Tenth Circuit was able to rule that the plaintiff parents did
not raise a constitutionally protected parental rights claim as the5
companion claim, and thus the plaintiffs' hybrid rights claim failed. 1
Courts in all circuits have addressed hybrid claims, but not all circuit
courts have addressed a hybrid situation.126 The authors will now survey
the dismal success of hybrid claims.
Born to hostility, the hybrid rights claim suffered nearly immediate
attack from Justice Souter in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
27 Justice Souter wrote:
City of Hialeah.1
[T]he distinction Smith draws strikes me as ultimately untenable. If a
122. Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of the Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993).
123. Id.
124. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 705 (9th Cir. 1999),
overruled on other grounds by 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000); Hicks v. Halifax County
Bd. of Educ., 93 F. Supp. 2d 649, 660 (E.D.N.C. 1999).
125. See Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir.

1998).
126. See, e.g., Hinrichs v. Whitbum, 772 F. Supp. 423, 432 (W.D. Wis. 1991) (stating
that if the plaintiffs' hybrid claim consisting of a free exercise and due process claim to
direct the upbringing of children was ripe it would subject the challenged government
action to strict scrutiny).
127. 508 U.S. 520, 521 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring).
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hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional right is
implicated, then the hybrid exception would probably be so vast as to
swallow the Smith rule, and, indeed, the hybrid exception would
cover the situation exemplified by Smith, since free speech and
associational rights are certainly implicated in the peyote ritual. But
if a hybrid claim is one in which a litigant would actually obtain an
exemption from a formally neutral, generally applicable law under
another constitutional provision, then there would have been no
reason for the Court in what Smith calls28the hybrid cases to have
mentioned the Free Exercise Clause at all. 1
Justice Souter thereby posits an exclusive dichotomy between
asserted rights, whereby hybrid claims are illogical. As discussed below,
however, the approach utilized by the Ninth Circuit requiring plaintiffs to
plead a colorable companion claim would seem to blunt much of the
force of Justice Souter's critique of Smith's hybrid claim exception.
The majority of courts that have addressed hybrid claims have ruled
that, even assuming the exception to Smith's general rule exists, the
plaintiffs had failed to make out a colorable claim of infringement of
another constitutionally protected right. The First, 129 Second, 30 Third,,"
Eighth,1 2 Ninth,' and Tenth'3 4 Circuits have all faced cases where the
courts ruled that the claim accompanying the free exercise claim lacked
merit and dismissed the hybrid claim on that ground.
In Salvation Army v. Department of Community Affairs of the State
of New Jersey,135 the Third Circuit addressed the Salvation Army's claim
of exemption from a state law regulating boarding houses. 136 The
Salvation Army ran numerous houses for the downtrodden that included
programs of spiritual and physical renewal. 37
Members of the
organization believe they are enjoined by God to provide for the material
welfare of those in need to create an environment conducive to spreading
the Gospel. 38 Thus, the centers at issue in Salvation Army provided for
the material needs of those who sought aid and also offered spiritual
counseling through mandatory activities such as religious services and
128.

Id. at 567.

129.
130.

See infra notes 147-53 and accompanying text.
It is difficult to tell exactly what the Second Circuit held as will become clear in

the discussion below. See infra notes 178-81 and accompanying text
131. See infra notes 135-46 and accompanying text.
132. See infra notes 154-63 and accompanying text.
133. See infra notes 170-77 and accompanying text.
134. See infra notes 164-69 and accompanying text.
135. 919 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1990).

136. Id. at 185.
137. See id. at 188 (stating that members of the Salvation Army believe that one of
the main reasons many are in poor positions is because of a spiritual deficit).
138. See id. at 188-89.
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prayer. 139
The Salvation Army claimed that New Jersey's regulation of the
centers infringed on the residents' and Salvation Army members' right to
religious association as protected and defined in Roberts v. United States
Jaycees,14 and in Smith itself.14 The Third Circuit admitted that the
Salvation Army did state a claim that its members' right to religious
association was infringed upon by the New Jersey regulation, but that the
right did not entitle the members to an exemption to a neutral and general
law. 142 This was because, the court found, the right to religious
association was derived from the Free Exercise Clause so that the court
could not reinforce a free exercise claim and create a hybrid rights
claim. 143 The Salvation Army also claimed, however, that its members'
44
associational right based on the Free Speech Clause was infringed.
The court determined that the regulations did not affect the Salvation
Army's message, and thus its members' associational rights were not
harmed. 45 In sum, the Salvation Army's hybrid rights claim failed for
46
lack of a second right to assert along with its free exercise claim.
The First Circuit, in a rather notorious case, rejected the hybrid
claim of parents objecting to their children's forced attendance at a
sexually explicit school assembly. 147 The parents in Brown v. Hot, Sexy,
& Safer Productions argued that the compelled attendance of their
children violated numerous rights, including a hybrid claim involving a
139. See id. at 189-90 (stating that while attendance at religious services and
participation in other religious activities was mandatory, potential residents were fully
informed in advance that if they accepted aid from the center they were expected to
participate in the spiritual counseling activities).
140. 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
141. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882
(1990).
142. See Salvation Army, 919 F.2d at 199.
143. See id. at 199-200. The court distinguished the language in Smith, holding that a
hybrid claim could only arise if the right to association claim was based not on free
exercise but on another clause in the First Amendment. Id.; see also N.Y. Employment
Relations Bd. v. Christ the King Reg'l High Sch., 682 N.E.2d 960, 964 (N.Y. 1997)
(rejecting the hybrid claim advanced by a Catholic high school that included the right to
free exercise combined with an asserted parental right to direct the religious education of
the children entrusted to its care). The Christ the King court ruled that "Smith did not
intend its hybrid exception to turn back on itself in circumstances such as this singularly
generic First Amendment setting and circumstance." Id. Instead, Smith required the
companion right to emanate from another constitutionally protected right and not from
the Free Exercise Clause. Id.
144. See Salvation Army, 919 F.2d. at 200.
145. Seeid.at201.
146. See id.; see also Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. The Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d
144, 165 n.26 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 881) ("Strict scrutiny may also
apply when a neutral, generally applicable law incidentally burdens rights protected by
'the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections .... .
147. Brown v. Hot, Sexy, & Safer Prod., Inc., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995).
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violation of their free exercise and parental right to control the education
and upbringing of their children. 48 The First Circuit rejected the
parental right claim, disingenuously construing the claim as one to
"dictate the curriculum at the public school to which they have chosen to
send their children."' 149 Thus, when it turned to the hybrid claim, the
court could distinguish Wisconsin v. Yoder' 50 with a wave of its
rhetorical hand by stating: "Here, the plaintiffs do not allege that the
one-time compulsory attendance at the Program threatened their entire
way of life."' 51 This tied in with the court's earlier rejection of the
parental rights claim (and the other claims the plaintiffs had asserted)
52
because without a second, companion right, the hybrid claim failed.'
The First Circuit thus took the position that for a hybrid claim to succeed
with an independently protected constitutional
it must be 1"conjoined
53
protection.'
The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the hybrid claims of a
church in Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings.154 The church
had purchased and utilized property in the central business district of
Hastings, which was zoned for business only. 55 The city denied the
church's request for a zoning variance. 56 The city pressured the church
to vacate its premises in the business district. 57 The church then sued,
claiming that the city's refusal to allow the church to operate in the
business district violated free speech, free exercise, free association, due
process, and equal protection rights. 5 8 The Eighth Circuit ruled that the
city zoning ordinance excluding religious activities, was a neutral time,
place, and manner restriction aimed only at curbing the presumably
undesirable effects of religious activities in the business district.' 59 Next,
the court found that because the city did not exclude other, similarly
situated, non-commercial entities, the grant of summary judgment was

148. Id. at 530.
149. Id. at 533.
150. 406 U.S. 205, 205 (1972).
151. Brown, 68 F.3d at 539.
152. See id. at 530.
153. Id.
154. 948 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1991).
155. Id.at 467.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. Id. at 467-68.
159. Id. at 467. However, because the city allowed other, non-commercial entities to
exist in the business district, the city's purported economic justification for the exclusion
was underinclusive. Id. at 471. Thus, the Eighth Circuit remanded on the issue of
whether the church was sufficiently like the other non-commercial entities in the square
such that exclusion of the church was discriminatory. Id.
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inappropriate.'
The church's hybrid rights claim included assertions of violations of
the right to speech and free exercise.1 61 The district court rejected the
hybrid claim because it dismissed the church's accompanying
constitutional claims, but the Eighth Circuit, affirming that a hybrid
claim is viable in light of Smith, remanded to see if the church's hybrid
claim was meritorious in light of its ruling that the church's free speech
rights may have been violated by a non-neutral regulation of
expression. 62 With little discussion, the court stated: "Our reversal of
the summary judgment orders breathes life back into the Church's
'hybrid rights'63 claim; thus, the district court should consider this claim
1
on remand."'
In Swanson v. Guthrie Independent School District, 64 the Tenth
Circuit rejected a hybrid claim after ruling that the accompanying claim
of a parental right to direct the plaintiffs' children's education was
without merit. 165 The parents and children sued the school district after
the district refused to allow the children, who were schooled at home, to
take those classes the parents were not themselves as adept at teaching as
was the school.' 66 The Swanson court held that, when faced with a
hybrid claim, it would "examine the claimed infringements on the party's
claimed rights to determine whether either the claimed rights or the
claimed infringements are genuine."' 167 A companion claim, to support a
hybrid cause of action, must show a "colorable claim of infringement,"
and the companion right must be "recognized and specific."'168 Like the
other courts discussed thus far, the Tenth Circuit rejected the companion
claim of a parental right to control education, finding that the school
board's decision on how to offer classes was determinative.169
The Ninth Circuit was initially more accommodating of hybrid
claims. 170 However, in Miller v. Reed, 171 the court rejected a hybrid

Id.at 472.
161. See id.
162. Id. at 473.
163. Id.
164. 135 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1998).
165. Id. at 702.
166. Id. at 696.
167. Id. at 699.
168. Id. at 700.
169. Id. The Tenth Circuit had earlier rejected a hybrid rights claim brought by
parents challenging the construction of a highway that would destroy the grave of their
daughter, finding that the proposed road would not interfere with their desire to be buried
alongside their daughter. Thiry v. Carlson, 78 F.3d 1491, 1496 (10th Cir. 1996).
160.

170. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1999),
reversed on other grounds by 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000) (enunciating its colorable
claim standard). The court reasoned that Smith and the hybrid exception to its rule is
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claim on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to allege a "colorable"
companion right. 172 The plaintiff applied for renewal of his California
driver's license but refused to supply his social security number based on
his rather unconventional religious beliefs. 173 Miller sued, alleging that
the denial of renewal of his driver's license violated his rights of
interstate travel and of free exercise. 174 The court found the claimed
infringement of his right to travel lacking merit because Miller still had
numerous other modes of travel and because what Miller
was really
75
asserting was a nonexistent fundamental right to drive.'
Turning to Miller's hybrid claim, the court declined to apply strict
scrutiny because Miller had alleged as a companion claim an "utterly
meritless claim.' ' 176 To state a valid hybrid claim in the Ninth Circuit, a
plaintiff must assert a colorable claim by showing that there was a "'fair
probability' or a 'likelihood' but not a certitude of success on the
merits."' 177 In sum, the Miller Court, like those discussed above, rejected
the hybrid claim on the weakness of the companion claim alleged by the
plaintiff.
The Second Circuit ruled against two state-employee plaintiffs and
their hybrid claim in Knight v. Connecticut Department of Public
Health.178 There the plaintiffs, while working for the state with AIDS
patients and other clients, sought to express their religious beliefs to their
clients. 179 The state reprimanded the plaintiffs, who then brought free
speech, free exercise, and hybrid claims. The court, after stating that the
binding precedent. 1d. at 704. The court also accepted the truth in Justice Souter's
criticism of the hybrid exception in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993), that the companion claim could not be independently viable,
and a hybrid claim could not simply entail alleging the violation of another frivolous right
because such a standard would allow the hybrid doctrine to swallow the Smith rule. Id. at
704-05. The practical compromise position, the one that gave force to the hybrid
exception, was a "colorable claim" standard. Id. at 705. The colorable claim standard
requires a plaintiff to plead a companion right that has a "fair probability" of success or is
"seemingly valid and genuine." Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).
The Thomas panel then determined that the plaintiffs had demonstrated colorable
claims under both the Free Speech and Takings Clauses, and ruled that the ordinance
substantially burdened the plaintiffs' right to free exercise. Id. at 712-14. With no
compelling state interest to back the city ordinance the court enjoined enforcement of the
ordinance against persons who, like the Thomas's, had religiously based objections to
being forced to rent apartments to homosexual cohabitants. Id.
171. 176 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 1999).
172. Id. at 1204.
173. Id. at 1204-05.
174. 1d. at 1205.
175. Id. at 1205-06.
176. Id. at 1208.
177. Id. at 1207 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
178. 275 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2001).
179. Id. at 160-63.
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hybrid right language in Smith was dicta and not binding, declined to
determine whether hybrid claims merited stricter scrutiny. 80 Instead, the
court held that "state action that regulates public conduct [that] infringes
more than one of a public employee's constitutional rights does not
warrant more heightened
scrutiny than each claim would warrant when
8
viewed separately."' '
Some courts have found hybrid claims wanting by simply assuming
that the plaintiff presented a valid hybrid claim, and finding that the state
had presented a compelling state interest to justify the free exercise
infringement. A Kentucky case followed this approach in Triplett v.
Livingston County Board of Education, in which the Kentucky Court of
Appeals held that the commonwealth had a compelling state interest in
requiring all students to take an assessment test.182 The plaintiffs had
asserted a hybrid claim consisting of free exercise and "their
constitutional rights as parents to direct the education and upbringing of
their children.' 83 The commonwealth utilized the challenged test to
improve tht delivery of educational services to students. 84 The court
ruled that the commonwealth's interest in improving the educational
85
system trumped the plaintiffs' asserted hybrid claim.
Another route pursued by courts eager to avoid granting exemptions
based on religiously motivated conduct is to rule that the party's
religious exercise was not substantially burdened. This approach was
followed by the Supreme Court prior to Smith. For example, in Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass 'n, 18 6 the Court ruled that a
road through land traditionally utilized by Native Americans for a
cemetery did not substantially burden their religious exercise.' 87
Likewise, in Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission,' 88 the
plaintiff landlord sued to have the state courts set aside a decision by the
California Commission on Fair Employment and Housing prohibiting her
from refusing to rent properties to unmarried cohabitants. 89 The
plaintiff refused to rent her property to unmarried couples based on her
religious beliefs. 190 Two persons, who had represented to the plaintiff
that they were married when in fact they were not, brought a complaint
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 167.
Id
967 S.W.2d 25, 32-33 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 30.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 33.
485 U.S. 439 (1988).
Id. at 476.
913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996).
Id. at912-13.
Id. at 912.
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to the Commission alleging that the plaintiffs desire to not rent to
unmarried cohabitants violated the California Unruh Civil Rights Act's
protected class of "marital status."' 91 The California Supreme Court
ruled that the plaintiffs right to free exercise was not burdened because
she did not have to rent apartments and could completely avoid the
imposed upon her religious exercise by discontinuing to
statutory burden 192
apartments.
rent
The aversion felt by the circuit courts to both recognize the validity
of hybrid claims and rule in favor of plaintiffs bringing their claims1 93 is
also evidenced in the district courts and the courts of the states.' 94 Of all
191. Id.at913-14.
192. Id. at 928-29.
193. The Fourth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, rejected the hybrid claim of a
plaintiff church, which asserted that application of the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA") to its religiously motivated activities violated the Free Exercise Clause. Reich
v. Shiloh True Light Church of Christ, 85 F.3d 616 (4th Cir. 1996). While assuming that
valid hybrid claims require strict scrutiny of regulations that substantially burden free
exercise, the court upheld an application of the FLSA to the church. The Fourth Circuit
had earlier, prior to Smith, upheld application of federal labor laws to similar plaintiffs
finding that the national interest in comprehensive and thorough labor safety regulation
was greater than the plaintiffs' free exercise interests. Brock v. Wendell's Woodworking,
Inc., 867 F.2d 196, 198-99 (4th Cir. 1989). Cases such as this point to the conclusion that
the unwillingness of courts to rule in favor of hybrid claims stems not from something
inherent in the hybrid claim itself, but is instead evidence of a broader hostility in the
courts to exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause.
194. See, e.g., Boone v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938 (E.D. Ark. 2002) (ruling that
the plaintiff parent did not have a parental right to prevent a school from immunizing her
child who attended the school and thus her hybrid parental right/religious exercise claim
failed); Ventura County Christian High Sch. v. City of San Buenaventura City Council,
233 F. Supp. 2d 1241 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (finding that the school had not presented a
colorable companion claim); Leebaert v. Harrington, 193 F. Supp. 2d 491 (D. Conn.
2002) (rejecting parental hybrid claim because the parent's right to direct the education of
his son was not infringed when the school forced his son to attend mandatory health
education classes); Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 235 F. Supp. 2d
1186 (D. Wyo. 2002) (ruling against the church's hybrid claim because it had failed to
make out a colorable claim of infringement of a companion right); Axson-Flynn v.
Johnson, 151 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1341 (D. Utah 2001) (applying a "colorable showing"
standard and ruling that a university student's hybrid challenge to a drama class
requirement that she break the Second Commandment, even though viable and requiring
strict scrutiny, failed to overcome the "more than reasonable relationship" between the
curricula and the purpose of ensuring that graduates have sufficient competency in their
chosen field); Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 108 F. Supp. 2d 681 (N.D. Tex.
2000) (rejecting a parental challenge to a school uniform policy using the "colorable
showing" standard because the plaintiffs failed to make a colorable showing that their
asserted companion rights, which included free speech, due process, privacy, and parental
right to raise children, were infringed by the policy, and thus the court denied the
plaintiffs' hybrid claims); Henderson v. Stanton, 76 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 1999) (ruling
that federal regulations barring the sale of merchandise on park property were valid as
applied to the plaintiffs who sold t-shirts bearing religious messages to fund their
ministry because the plaintiffs' companion free speech claims were previously
dismissed); Krafchow v. Town of Woodstock, 62 F. Supp. 2d 698 (N.D.N.Y. 1999)
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of the cases brought by plaintiffs that include a hybrid claim, only five
plaintiffs have succeeded in convincing a court of the merit of the
claim.195

In Hicks v. Halifax County Board of Education,'96 the plaintiffs
challenged a school uniform policy. The plaintiff guardian believed that
"adherence to the uniform policy would violate her basic religious
beliefs" and would "[demonstrate] an allegiance to the spirit of the antiChrist."' 97 The plaintiff asserted a hybrid claim based on free exercise
and her due process right to direct the upbringing of her child.' 98
Construing the plaintiffs liberty interest as the parental right to "send her
child to school without a uniform ...[in] her effort to direct the child's
moral and religious upbringing," the court found that the plaintiff had
(ruling that even though the plaintiff had presented a valid free speech claim, the fact that
the city ordinance in question did not substantially interfere with his religious exercise,
mandated summary judgment against the plaintiff on his hybrid rights claim); Thiry v.
Carlson, 887 F. Supp. 1407 (D. Kan. 1995) (finding that because the plaintiffs had not
presented sufficient evidence that their alleged right of "family unity and integrity" would
be infringed by a proposed highway, the plaintiffs' hybrid claim failed); Jane L. v.
Barngerter, 794 F. Supp. 1537 (D. Utah 1992) (ruling against the plaintiffs who asserted a
hybrid claim seeking an exemption to Utah's abortion law because the plaintiffs' free
speech right-a right to religiously motivated abortion counseling-was not viable).
Hybrid claims have fared no better in state courts. See, e.g., Catholic Charities
of Sacramento v. Super. Ct., 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (ruling that a
challenge to a California law requiring Catholic Charities to provide health insurance that'
covers contraception based on a hybrid claim involving free speech failed because the
plaintiff failed to make out a colorable claim that its free speech rights were infringed);
City Chapel Evangelical Free Inc. v. City of South Bend, 744 N.E.2d 443 (Ind. 2001)
(finding that a hybrid right predicated on a claim of free exercise and on a right to
religious association is a viable hybrid claim and remanding for further trial on the issues
of substantial burden); Hill-Murray Fed'n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch.
Maplewood, 487 N.W.2d 857 (Minn. 1992) (ruling that the plaintiff Catholic high school
did not put forth a valid hybrid claim because the school could not assert as a companion
right the right of a religious institution to care for and direct its lay employees); Health
Serv. Div. v. Temple Baptist Church, 814 P.2d 130 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) (accepting
hybrid rights in principle but finding that the plaintiff church, without showing that any
of its members suffered a rights violation, could not assert a hybrid rights claim); Church
at 295 S.18th St. v. Employment Dep't, 28 P.3d 1185 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a
church's hybrid claim based on free speech and free exercise, even if hybrid claims are
viable, was without merit because the unemployment tax regulation did not infringe on
the church's freedom of speech).
195. The district of Maryland, in dicta, recognized that had the plaintiff established
her companion free speech right to wear a certain type of headdress to school, she would
have presented a valid hybrid claim. lsaacs v. Bd. of Educ. of Howard County, 40 F.
Supp. 2d 335, 338 (D. Md. 1999). As it was, because the school's no-hats policy did not
violate the plaintiff's free speech rights, the plaintiff did not have a viable hybrid claim.
Id.
196. 93 F. Supp. 2d 649 (E.D.N.C. 1999).
197. ld. at 653.
198. Id. at 657. The plaintiff had also urged the district court that her free speech
rights were also implicated, but the court rejected free speech as a companion claim. Id.
at 657 n.4.
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alleged "a genuine claim, supported by evidence in the record." 199 The
court held that the second companion claim need not be independently
viable.2 °0 Instead, a plaintiff need only bring to the table the "mere
presence of the [second protected] interest, as a genuine claim" to trigger
court
the heightened scrutiny occasioned by hybrid claims. 20 1 The
20 2
judgment.
summary
for
motion
defendants'
the
therefore rejected
The Southern District of Texas has also ruled in favor of a
plaintiff's hybrid claim. In Chalifoux v. New Caney Independent School
District,20 3 the student plaintiffs sued to overturn a school district rule
that did not allow them to wear rosaries as necklaces in school because
the rosaries could be gang symbols. It was uncontested that the plaintiffs
were sincere in their religious beliefs and that there were no incidents of
gang members wearing rosaries. 20 4 The court found that the plaintiffs
had presented a valid hybrid claim comprised of free exercise and free
speech causes of action. 205 As a result, the court asked whether the
school district's rule bore "more than a 'reasonable relation' to [the
,,206
The court concluded that the prohibition
district's] stated objective.
20 7
plaintiffs' free exercise rights.
the
violated
rosaries
on wearing
The Eastern District of Texas upheld a hybrid rights claim in
Alabama & Coushatta Tribes of Texas v. Trustees of the Big Sandy
Independent School District.20 8 The plaintiffs were Indian students and
parents who objected to the school district's prohibition on the length of
hair on boys. 20 9 The plaintiffs claimed that the dress regulation
conflicted with and burdened the boys' ability to practice their Indian
faith and the ability of the students' parents to educate and raise their
children in the traditional religion. 210 The district court granted plaintiffs
a preliminary injunction after finding that the plaintiffs had a viable
hybrid cause of action consisting of free exercise, free speech, and a

199. Id. at 662.
200. Id.
201. Id. The district court relied heavily on the language of Yoder to arrive at its
conclusion that hybrid claims were viable simply because of the fact that two or more
claims were conjoined in one claim. Id. While agreeing with Justice Souter's Lukumi
concurrence that the mere allegation of a claim was insufficient, the district court ruled
that a "genuine" claim supported by evidence was sufficient to trigger heightened
scrutiny. Id.
202. Id. at 663.
203. 976 F. Supp. 659 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
204. Id. at 665-67.
205. Id. at 671.
206. Id. (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972)).
207. Id.
208. 817 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. Tex. 1993).
209. Id. at 1323.
210. Id. at 1324-27.
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parental right to direct the upbringing of their children.2 '
The Washington Supreme Court, in First United Methodist Church
of Seattle v. Hearing Examiner for the Seattle Landmarks Preservation
Board,212 ruled in favor of a hybrid claim brought by a church that
disputed designation of its building by the city of Seattle as a historical
landmark.2t 3 Designation as such would have required the church to
receive board approval for any changes to the church structure.2t 4 The
court ruled in favor of the church, finding that the church presented a
valid hybrid rights claim consisting of a free exercise right and a free
expression claim. 21 5 The court ruled that the "church building itself was
'an expression of Christian belief and message.' 21 6 Because the city
presented no compelling interest in landmark preservation, the court held
that the landmark designation was unconstitutional. 1 7
A hybrid claim brought by parents seeking to home-school their
children was successful in Michigan.2 18 The Michigan Supreme Court,
in People v. DeJonge, ruled that strict scrutiny applied to the claim
brought by two Roman Catholic parents seeking an exemption to a
Michigan requirement that home-schooled teachers be certified like
regular school teachers. 21 9 The court ruled that the plaintiffs had
implicated two rights: free exercise and the Pierce parental right to
direct the education of children. 220 The state's interest in requiring
certified home-school teachers was not essential to its interest in the
education of its citizens. 221 The court also found that the means chosen
by Michigan to ensure a properly educated citizenry was more intrusive
than necessary.222 As a result, the court exempted the plaintiffs, and

211. Id. at 1338. The speech involved was the ability of the Indian students to wear
long hair as a symbol of their culture and traditional practices. Id. at 1334.
The Northern District of New York found that a similar hybrid claim asserted by
a prison guard necessitated strict scrutiny under the Smith hybrid exception. Rourke v.
N.Y. Dep't of Corr. Servs., 915 F. Supp. 525, 541 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). The plaintiff guard
was an Indian who claimed that the prison's regulation forbidding long hair on men
violated his religious practice and his free speech rights. Id. The district court ruled that
the plaintiff had presented a viable hybrid claim because the long hair was a symbolic
expression of religious belief. Id. The court found, in effect, that the state did not have a
compelling state interest to overcome the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 543.
212. 916 P.2d 374 (Wash. 1996).
213. Id. at 382.
214. Id. at 378.
215. Id. at 381.
216. Id. at 379 (quotations and citation omitted).
217. Id. at 381.
218. People v. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127, 129-30 (Mich. 1993).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 134.
221. Id. at 141.
222. Id. at 143.
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parents like them, from the strictures of Michigan's certification
223

requirement.
The Sixth Circuit is sui generis. It has refused to recognize hybrid
claims. In Kissinger v. Board of Trustees,224 the court faced a hybrid
claim consisting of a free exercise claim along with free speech and
association, due process, and equal protection claims. 225 The Sixth
Circuit questioned "how a state regulation would violate the Free
Exercise Clause if it implicates other constitutional rights but would not
violate the Free Exercise Clause if it did not implicate other
constitutional rights." 226 The court stated that it would refuse to apply a
different standard of review for hybrid claims "until the Supreme Court
holds that legal standards under the Free Exercise Clause vary depending
227
on whether other constitutional rights are implicated.,
The Sixth Circuit reaffirmed its rejection of hybrid claims in
Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of
Stratton.22 8 There, the plaintiffs challenged an ordinance restricting their
ability to distribute religious literature.22 9 The plaintiffs brought free
speech and free exercise claims, along with a hybrid claim. 230 The court
rejected the plaintiffs' free speech claim, finding that the ordinance was a
content neutral, time, place, and manner restriction. 231 The court then, in
line with circuit precedent, rejected the plaintiffs' contention that hybrid
claims require a court to strictly scrutinize restrictions on religious
freedom.232 In doing so, the court argued that it did "not believe that the
Court held [in Smith], nor has it ever held, that a different level of
scrutiny applies to laws potentially affect [sic] hybrid rights. 233
223.

Id.

224.

5 F.3d 177 (6th Cir. 1993).

225. Id. at 179.
226. Id. at 180. The court found solace in Justice Souter's concurrence, the same one
relied upon by the Ninth Circuit to fashion its colorable claim standard. Id. at 180 n.1.
227. Id. It is mysterious that the Sixth Circuit accepts without qualm the varying
standards of review under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses-standards that
have changed over the years along with the different suspect classes and fundamental
rights at issue-but does not accept the clear pronouncement in Smith that certain
combinations of constitutionally protected rights are subject to more stringent protection.
228. 240 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 534 U.S. 971, rev'd, 536 U.S. 150
(2002).
229. See id.
230. See id.
231.

Id. at 561.

232. Id. The court construed Kissinger as standing for the proposition that the
Supreme Court "did not explain how a hybrid rights claim would alter the level of
scrutiny." Id. at 562; see also Prater v. City of Burnside, 289 F.3d 417, 430 (6th Cir.
2002) (citation omitted) ("[T]his court has rejected 'the assertion that the Supreme Court
established ... that laws challenged by hybrid claims are subject to strict scrutiny."').
233.

Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, 240 F.3d at 561.

In Hyman v. City of Louisville, 132 F. Supp. 2d 528 (W.D. Ky. 2001), a district
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All of the different circuits (except for the Sixth Circuit and perhaps
the Second), even while dismissing all of the claims brought before
them, have at least paid homage to the theoretical possibility of success
on a hybrid cause of action. The different circuits have also produced
different standards governing the showing a plaintiff must make to
adequately plead a hybrid claim. The First and D.C. Circuits have ruled
that only independently viable constitutional claims would suffice as
companion claims. Recall that in Brown v. Hot, Sexy, & Safer
2 34 the First Circuit rejected the hybrid claim of parents
Productions,
seeking to vindicate their right to have their children not attend a
sexually explicit school event. In doing so, the court required that any
hybrid claims have as companion claims "independently protected
constitutional" claims. 235 Likewise, the D.C. Circuit noted in passing
that the defendant Catholic University had a viable hybrid claim because
enforcement of Title VII against the University would have violated the
Establishment Clause (excessive entanglement), thus allowing the
University to assert a hybrid rights claim. 236 This standard, requiring a
showing of an independently viable constitutional right, is effectively the
same as that followed by the Sixth Circuit. If a plaintiff has asserted a
viable constitutional claim, there is no need for a hybrid cause of action,
but in the First and D.C. Circuits, without an independently viable
companion claim, a plaintiff cannot assert a viable hybrid claim. In
court denied the plaintiff's claim that a recent city ordinance preventing discrimination on
the basis of "sexual orientation" and "gender identity" violated his First Amendment right
to free exercise. The plaintiff, a doctor, argued that because he would not comply with
the ordinance based on his religious beliefs he was subject to prosecution. Hyman's legal
argument was creative. He asserted that because the ordinance exempted church
institutions whose beliefs prevented them from hiring people asserting protection under
the new protected class designations but did not exempt other employers such as himself,
the ordinance was not neutral or generally applicable. Id. at 536-38.
The district court ruled that because the exemptions in the ordinance were not
inserted for the purpose of punishing people like the plaintiff for their religious exercise,
the exemptions were neutral in the sense meant in Smith. The court also rejected the
plaintiff's state constitutional religious freedom claim (whose religious protection
provisions are construed similarly to the federal Constitution's provisions) on the same
basis and further noted that the Sixth Circuit does not recognize hybrid claims. Id. at
540.
234. 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995).
235. Id. at 539.
236. EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The D.C.
Circuit's requirement of at least one independently viable constitutional claim was
reaffirmed in Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The court
rejected claims brought by evangelical Christians seeking an exemption from a Park
Service rule forbidding the sale of message-bearing t-shirts on certain portions of the
national mall. The court, having ruled against the plaintiffs' free exercise and free speech
claims, also repudiated the plaintiffs' contention that "the combination of two untenable
claims equals a tenable one." Id. Instead, the circuit found that "in law as in
mathematics zero plus zero equals zero." Id.
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essence then, the First, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits do not recognize hybrid
claims that consist of two merely "colorable" claims.
The approach more consistent with Smith is the "colorable claim" or
"colorable showing" approach.2 37 This standard was first utilized in the
Tenth Circuit case of Swanson v. Gutherie Independent School
District.238 The court ruled that Smith required plaintiffs to make a
"colorable showing of infringement of recognized and specific
constitutional rights." 239 The court sought to prevent plaintiffs from
attaining strict scrutiny review by simply asserting a frivolous right or
one that was not infringed upon. 240 The Tenth Circuit was followed only
by the Ninth Circuit and some district courts.24 1
The above rendition of the effects of Smith on claims of believers
for religious exemptions shows the lack of success occasioned by hybrid
claims. While it is generally assumed that the hybrid exception was an
expedient created by Justice Scalia to preserve the Court's prior
jurisprudence, and thus gamer the necessary votes to sustain the general
Smith rule, that fact alone should not prevent lower courts from honestly
reviewing hybrid claims. Instead, as in other areas of the law where
cases are clearly the result of internal compromise among the members
of the Court, the law as written is applied despite its somewhat
unprincipled character. A good recent example of this phenomena is
United States v. Dickerson, in which the majority attempted, with great
difficulty and little success, to synthesize the Court's prior Miranda
caselaw and, at the same time, prevent application of 18 U.S.C. §
3501.242 While the result in Dickerson was the culmination of a process
of compromise, few would have the temerity, as does the Sixth Circuit,
to reject out-of-hand any application of the Dickerson rule.
The colorable claim standard, properly applied, appears to most
closely approximate the design of Smith. Recall that the Court in Smith
enunciated a rule-neutral laws of general applicability generally do not
permit an exception-that directly conflicted with the Court's modem
precedent. The Court then defined a class of cases that were exempt
from the purview of the new Smith rule. Systematically, the Court
reviewed its free exercise jurisprudence, citing the different rights that,
237. See Timothy J. Santoli, Note, A Decade After Employment Division v. Smith:
Examining How Courts Are Still Grapplingwith the Hybrid-Rights Exception to the Free
Exercise Clause of the FirstAmendment, 34 SUFFOLK U. L. REv.649, 663 (2001) (urging
the adoption of the colorable claim standard).
238. 135 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1998).
239. Id. at 700.
240. Id.
241. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1999);
Hicks v. Halifax County Bd. of Educ., 93 F. Supp. 2d 649 (E.D.N.C. 1999).
242. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
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when brought in conjunction with a free exercise claim, received
heightened scrutiny.243 Those rights were: speech, free press, right of
parents to direct the upbringing of children, right of parents to direct their
children's education, and free association.244 In the cases cited by the
Court as asserting the above listed rights, the claimants had clearly done
more than simply allege a second or companion right. Instead, the
plaintiffs proffered viable or colorable rights. Thus, any contention by
the various circuits that the hybrid claims are incoherent, or too difficult
to apply, is bereft of knowledge of the Court's past jurisprudence.
The quintessential example of a hybrid claim that logically
mandated heightened review is Wisconsin v. Yoder. 24 5 In Yoder,
members of the Old Order Amish religion challenged Wisconsin's
mandatory education requirement.246 The plaintiffs objected to the
state's requirement that their children attend local public schools beyond
the eighth grade.247 The Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice
Burger, noted the rights asserted by the plaintiffs: "fundamental rights
and interests ... specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause...
and the traditional interests of parents with respect to the religious
upbringing of their children. 4 8 The Court thoroughly reviewed the
claim advanced by the Amish that public schooling beyond the eighth
grade threatened the ability of the community to perpetuate itself.249 The
Court wanted to ensure that the "Amish religious faith and their mode of
life are, as they claim, inseparable and interdependent." 250 This
requirement is much like the colorable claim standard whereby a
companion claim advanced by a hybrid claim plaintiff will be scrutinized
to determine its viability.
Perhaps presaging Smith's rule, the Yoder Court noted that free
exercise jurisprudence rejected the Reynolds idea that "religiously
grounded conduct is always outside the protection of the Free Exercise
Clause."25 ' Instead, the Court had settled into a balancing of interests
when government regulation arguably impaired religiously motivated
actions.
243. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82
(1990).
244. Id.
245. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
246. Id. at 207-08.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 214.
249. Id. at 215.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 220 (emphasis added). The Court admitted that "activities of individuals,
even when religiously based, are often subject to regulation by the States." Id. at 220.
But because a "regulation neutral on its face" may violate a citizen's free exercise, the
Court had granted exceptions. Id.
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Relying on the right of the Amish parents to direct the religious
upbringing of their children, and on both the parents' and children's free
exercise rights, the Court subjected the Wisconsin statute to strict
scrutiny. 252 "[W]hen the interests of parenthood are combined with a
free exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record, more than
merely a 'reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of
the State' is required to sustain the validity of the State's requirement
under the First Amendment., 253 Thus, two colorable claims of
infringement converged in Yoder to mandate heightened scrutiny.
There may be a number of factors at work in the hostile reception
hybrid claims have received: (1) the fact that the hybrid exception was
created in what many view as a post-hoc attempt to distinguish
controlling precedent; (2) the compelling interest test in the realm of free
exercise jurisprudence was never "compelling," and hybrid claims
simply suffer a continuation of that reluctance to excuse conduct because
of religious belief; (3) the difficulty in determining the proper burdens
and procedures to assert a hybrid claim-the analytical difficulty in
conceptualizing how hybrid claims fit into free exercise jurisprudence;
and (4) growing hostility to exemptions from state anti-discrimination
laws with ever increasing numbers of protected classes.
The third line of reasoning is clearly at work in the Sixth Circuit's
refusal to even consider hybrid right claims. The Sixth Circuit, in
overruling language in prior precedent, quoted from Justice Souter's
Lukumi concurrence criticizing the analytical viability of the hybrid right
exception.254 The court found hybrid claims "completely illogical. ' 2 5
Until the Supreme Court more clearly delineates the contours of hybrid
claims, the Sixth Circuit will sit, stupefied.256
Other courts have also struggled with the analytical difficulty of
discerning what two types of rights and what showing plaintiffs must
make for each right to assert a viable hybrid claim. As previously
discussed, the colorable claim standard seems to avoid, reasonably well,
the jurisprudential morass created by Smith.
The most likely culprit for the poor performance of the hybrid claim
in the courts may not be any inherent deficiency in the hybrid rights
doctrine itself (although that certainly adds to the difficulty of
application), but instead the courts' deeply ingrained reticence to grant
252. Id. at 233-34.
253. Id. at 233.
254. Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of the Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 n.1 (6th Cir.
1993).
255. Id. at 180.
256. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 240 F.3d
553, 562 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 534 U.S. 971, rev'd, 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
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exemptions based on religious claims. As noted by Justice Scalia in
Smith itself, and later by commentators, religiously based exemptions to
laws not aimed at the suppression of religion are strong medicine that is
difficult to apply in a principled manner. In addition to the difficulty
with courts determining the sincerity of a plaintiffs religious belief, free
exercise exemptions create "a private right to ignore generally applicable
laws ... a constitutional anomaly. 257 The Supreme Court itself has been
extremely unsolicitous of free exercise claims. Between Sherbert v.
Verner's pronouncement of the compelling interest test in the area of free
258
exercise and Smith, the Court had rejected thirteen out of seventeen
claims brought before it. Three of the four victories for free exercise
plaintiffs pre-Smith were in the unemployment compensation context
directly governed by Sherbert. Thus, the only true victory for free
exercise plaintiffs prior to Smith, under the compelling interest test, was
Yoder. In other words, it is entirely possible to view the five victories for
free exercise plaintiffs asserting hybrid claims as a simple continuation
of the prior hostility of courts to religious exemptions.2 59
In fact, the percentages of victories prior to and after Smith are not
dramatically different. Of the nine precedent-setting post-Smith circuit
court cases addressing hybrid claims, none were successful. 260 But the
rate of victory in the district courts is higher, although not higher than the
pre-Smith victory rate in the appellate courts or district courts. In district
courts across the nation, there were three victories for plaintiffs out of ten
district court cases. All of these victories occurred in the public school
context and two of the three hybrid claims involved, as companion
claims, the right to free expression and the parental right to direct
education. Further, in the state courts, there were victories for two
hybrid plaintiffs out of ten cases involving hybrid claims. One involved
free expression and the other contained a claim for parental right to direct

257. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886
(1990).
258. James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An
IconoclasticAssessment, 78 VA.L.REV. 1407, 1413-35 (1992).
259. The reception free exercise claims received in the federal appellate courts prior
to Smith is no warmer than that given by the Supreme Court. Ryan found that of ninetyseven free exercise claims brought to the federal appellate courts in the 1980s, eighty-five
were unsuccessful. Id. at 1417. Of the twelve successful claims, however, only
approximately one or two would have resulted in different outcomes under the Smith
regime. Id.
One must also consider, however, the possibility that fewer free exercise claims
are initially brought by plaintiffs because of the more explicitly hostile Smith regime, and
thus the result of Smith's more restrictive rule is more pronounced than the research for
this article revealed.
260. The D.C., Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits all have had two hybrid cases, none
of which were successful.
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education.
This hostility may also be the result of a more "progressive" attitude
towards persons with traditional religious beliefs (especially evangelical
Christians) seeking exemption from laws or regulations synchronous
with the judges' leanings. One suspects this factor was at work in Brown
v. Hot, Sexy, & Safer Productions, Inc.26 1 There, the First Circuit
employed the false characterization of the plaintiffs' assertion of rights as
one to "dictate the curriculum at the public school to which they have
chosen to send their children., 262 The plaintiffs claimed that they were
not given advance notice of the program and thus were unable to ask that
the school excuse their children.263
Having mischaracterized the
plaintiffs' claims, the court could easily rule against the plaintiffs.
The last potential reason for the unsuccessful results of most hybrid
claims is the increasing regulation of private life by state governments
through anti-discrimination statutes. Whereas at one time there were
only a few protected classes-race, ethnicity, national origin, and
gender-today states have expanded the list to include many classes of
persons. Originally, few if any religions objected to hiring or renting to
people protected by the classes covered by anti-discrimination statutes.
The notable exception was gender, but many statutes forbid application
of that protected class to religions whose doctrine forbid women in some
positions. Today, by contrast, classes covered include sexual orientation,
gender identity, and marital status, and carry great potential for conflict
between orthodox Christian faiths and the modem drive towards the
eradication of moral distinctions. The result is a great reluctance by
courts to grant exemptions to statutes viewed as progressive and
beneficent.
There are numerous cases discussed above that fit the mold of a
federal court unwilling to grant an exemption from a state antidiscrimination law. The Ninth Circuit in Thomas v. Anchorage Equal
Rights Commission2 64 refused to grant standing to plaintiffs seeking an
exemption from Anchorage's law requiring landlords to rent to
unmarried cohabitants because renting to unmarried cohabitants violated
their Biblically based beliefs. 265 The en banc court ruled that the case
was not ripe because the plaintiffs had not been threatened with
enforcement with the city regulation.2 66 Likewise, the California
Supreme Court ruled that Christian landlords did not have to rent
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995).
Id.at 533.
Id. at 530.
220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).
Id.at 1142.
Id.
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property to earn a living and were not required by their religious beliefs
to rent property, and thus their religious exercise was not substantially
infringed by state regulations requiring the plaintiffs to rent to unmarried
cohabitants.26 7
One would expect that most plaintiffs could plead their causes of
action to fit into the hybrid exception, thus dulling the impact of Smith.
Almost always, as evidenced by the cases relied upon as examples of
past hybrid claims, a plaintiff will have two or more claims that could be
combined to bring a hybrid claim.
In summary, despite the harsh backlash by academics, the Court has
retained the Smith rule for over twelve years. One of the few promising
aspects of the Smith decision, from the point of view of religious liberty,
was the hybrid rights exception. But, as we have seen, for a number of
reasons few courts have been willing to approve of such claims, with
some even denying the existence of such claims altogether.
V.

The Hybrid Claim as a Rule

To explain that the hybrid rights doctrine was not an exercise in
rulemaking, but an exercise in descriptive legal history, is not helpful. In
fact, that response not only fails to predict, it fails to satisfactorily
describe. If, as Justice Scalia suggests, certain religious claimants were
exempted from neutral laws of general application because their interests
were hybridized, and did not sound in religious belief sole, simply saying
so neither explains why their claims warranted departure from the rule,
nor predicts when such claims would sunnount the state's interest in
generally applicable laws in the future.
That the hybrid rights doctrine has wholly failed to function as a
predictive rule for departing from the general application standard of
Smith is all the more remarkable considering Justice Scalia's professed
preference for formalism and predictability in juridical rules.268 Justice
Scalia, since his ascension to the Court, has been a vocal critic of
judicially created balancing tests, and an ardent supporter of-if judges
are going to "make law"-judicially created rules.269 Justice Scalia's
views on judicial rulemaking are found throughout opinions he has
authored and in some of his academic writings.27 °
In his book, A Matter of Interpretation, Justice Scalia argues in
favor of a variant of democratic formalism and against more freewheeling judicial interpretation of statutes and the Constitution, and in
267.
268.
269.
270.

Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996).
See infra notes 271-88 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 271-88 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 271-88 and accompanying text.

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 108:2

doing so makes clear his preference for clear rules of conduct.271
Through his criticism of what he labels "common-law adjudication" in
an age of democratically enacted legal texts, Justice Scalia reveals a
marked inadequacy of nonoriginalism: no rule guiding the interpretation
or the evolution of interpretations of texts. 272 The content of legal
documents (the Constitution, for example) under nonoriginalism is
subject to the whims ofjudges leading to unpredictability and uncertainty
as to the extent of rights and duties and the authority of democratic
institutions.273 Justice Scalia values original meaning adjudication, in
part because it offers a clear rule by which the interpretation of texts is
achieved. 74 The interpreter must look to the meaning of the text at the
time it was given its binding authority.275 This theoretically simple (yet
practically more difficult) approach to interpreting legal texts disposes of
the rather messy questions of legislative intent, canons of interpretation,
and other methods of ascertaining the "intent" of a legislature, in
exchange for the straightforward question of the meaning of the text
when given authority. 276 Originalism also furthers a clear separation of
powers and allows more directly responsible organs of government to
resolve questions of policy by explicitly and plainly sidelining judicial
lawmaking. 7
It is the emphasis on stability and notice that motivated Justice
Scalia's article, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules.278 In his article,
Justice Scalia notes that in a democracy the rule of law-rules
promulgated by the people-is given preference.2 79 Rules give notice to
those governed by the rules, carry the imprimatur of the representative

271.
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW (1997). For a thorough review of Scalia's position expounded in the book, see Cass
R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia's DemocraticFormalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529 (1997).
272. SCALIA, supra note 271, at 44-47.
273. Id. at 39-46.
274. Id. at 140. Justice Scalia's relating originalism to the value of rules in
adjudication is criticized by Richard Fallon. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law"
Fallon
as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1997).
characterizes Scalia as a "formalist ideal type," by which he means that Justice Scalia
believes that there are clear rules that provide maximal guides to citizens and their
behavior while simultaneously constraining judicial discretion. Id. at 14-17. The main
criticism of Justice Scalia's view is not one concerning the substance of his work but is
rather to assert that there are other values competing with the value in clear rules, which
are not accommodated in Justice Scalia's framework, such as substantive justice (whether
the rules are just).
275. SCALIA, supra note 271, at 140.
276. Id. at 16-36.
277. Id. at 9, 41-42.
278. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175
(1989).
279. Id. at 1176.
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branches, lessen judicial discretion, and do "justice" to most that fall
under the rule.280
These rules include constitutional clauses and
provisions because the same rule of law values that apply in legislatively
enacted rules also apply to constitutional rules. As a result of their
clarity, rules are easy to criticize and replace if considered unjust, in
contrast to judicial decisions, especially constitutional decisions that rely
on amorphous, ad hoc balancing tests to determine the "just" outcome. 281
Rules also improve the equal application of the law because there is less
room for judges of different persuasions to dispense punishment than
with balancing, where the factors considered may count for nothing or
everything depending on the judge and the party appearing before the
court. 282 Perhaps most importantly, clear rules increase the exercise of
liberty because persons will know to what point their actions are
protected and can exercise their rights up to that point. If liberty is
conditioned on balancing tests as opposed to a clear rule, the potential for
post hoc condemnation increases the risk of exercising liberty and thus
decreases the exercise of liberty in questionable areas.
Scalia's view of judicial rulemaking and preference for rules over
judicial balancing has impacted many areas of the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence. A good example of this impact is in the area of regulatory
takings. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority, restated the "categorical" rule the Court had
previously alluded to; when a regulation of property deprives an owner
of "all economically beneficial or productive use of [his] land," a
compensable taking has occurred.25 3 Justice Scalia noted the Court's
previous regulatory takings jurisprudence, guided by balancing all of the
factors of a case, was unable to give any guidance to what constituted a
compensable regulatory taking and the benefits of this clear rule.284
In the notoriously subjective and opaque area of substantive due
process, Justice Scalia has labored to constrain judicial discretion and
create predictability by adhering to the relatively clear rule that, to
receive protection, rights not enumerated in the Constitution must be "an
interest traditionally protected by our society. 28 5 In the Court's
280. Id. at 1176-78.
281.

Id. at 1178.

282. Id. at 1182.
283. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
284. Id. at 1014-15, 1016 n.7.

285.

Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989). For other areas of the law

where Justice Scalia advocates resort to traditional practices to restrict judicial discretion
and maintain the judicial branch in its proper role, see Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo,
S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund,Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999) (holding that the equity powers of
the federal courts are limited to those traditionally exercised by courts of equity unless
and until changed by Congress), and Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding
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separation of powers and federalism jurisprudence, Justice Scalia has
advocated for clear, formal distinctions between the branches of the
federal government and between the states and the federal government.286
Justice Scalia believes that clear rules of demarcation enhance the
benefits brought about by doctrines such as separation of powers and
federalism:
protection of rights, constraining power, limiting
government, allowing experimentation.28 7 Even in areas of law where
the benefits of a clear rule are not immediately apparent (or do not, as in
the separation of powers context, lead to other benefits), Justice Scalia
has argued for clear rules.2 8
It is this characteristic of Justice Scalia's jurisprudence-his desire
for clear rules-that should lead one to conclude that the Smith rule and
the categorization of all prior caselaw as hybrid claims, were both meant
to rationalize the Court's jurisprudence and provide guidance to the
courts and litigants in future cases. Justice Scalia and the majority were
faced with past cases that conflicted with the new Smith rule (or the old
rule, if one believes that the Smith rule, along with Reynolds, was
consistent with the original meaning of the Clause). The result was a
synthesis of that line of cases in the form of a rule. The rule is clear to
read but more difficult in application; however, as argued above, the
colorable claim standard alleviates much of the alleged difficulty
associated with hybrid claims. Further, difficulty of application has been
a hallmark of the caselaw from the Warren and Burger Courts, and so
one should expect the same characteristics to carry over into the hybrid
claim because it was a synthesis of cases from those eras.
Thus, one should view the hybrid claim as nothing more than
Justice Scalia's continuing effort to "ruleify" the Court's jurisprudence
and bring about all of the benefits of rules in the law. There is no reason
why lower courts should refuse to follow the rule announced by the
Court for hybrid claims while following similar rules in all other areas of
our nation's law.
that sense-enhancing technology to gather information from the interior of a home that
authorities could not otherwise have obtained without physical intrusion into the home is

a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment given the traditional protections
afforded homes at common law and throughout our Nation's history).
286. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (ruling unconstitutional
the Brady Bill because it conflicted with the rule that Congress may not commandeer the
executives of the states).
287. In Printz, for example, clearly delineating the lines of authority had the benefits
of, under federalism, placing the states in opposition to the federal government and
thereby helping limit federal power. Id.
288. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia,
J.,concurring) (stating that he views the Equal Protection Clause as imposing strict
scrutiny upon all racial classifications because of the incredible harm done by such
classifications to the fabric of society, even if the classifications are "benign").
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Conclusion

In the twelve years since the Supreme Court shifted its free exercise
jurisprudence, citizens bringing hybrid claims have been unsuccessful.
In all courts across the nation, only five victories can be counted. While
it is debatable whether Smith merely rectified an aberrant jurisprudence
or whether Smith was an incredible misstep in the area of religious civil
rights, what is clear is that individuals who assert a right to an exemption
from a neutral, generally applicable law will face entrenched opposition.

